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The statement of facts as contained in the petition of 
the appellants and the brief of the appellee appear to be 
sufficient to show. clearly the material facts in this case. 
Therefore, it is not deemed necessary in this brief to make 
a further statement of fact. 
As is stated in the brief of the appellee this is essentially 
a fact case. However, the contention of the appellant in 
reference to these facts is that the evidence on behalf of 
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John D. Greenhow, is insufficient to establish a parol trust 
in land, and failed to establish such a contract as would 
entitle one to its specific performance. 
In the case of Jesser v. Armentrout, 100 Va. 666, which 
case was decided before the question of a parol trust in 
Virginia had been definitely decided, the court said: "If a 
parol trust can be created in land, the declaration should be 
unequivocal and explicit, and established by clear and con-
vincing testimony." In Young v. Holland, et als., 117 Va. 
433, the court held that a trust in land could be established 
by parol. In that particular case, however, there was a 
question of a resulting trust which does not appear in the 
case at hand. However, since it has been decided that a 
trust could be established by parol in Virginia the rule 
has been definitely established that the evidence must be 
unequivocal and explicit, and established by clear and con-
vincing testimony. (See Powers v. Long, 131 Va. 284; 
Hook v. Hook, 126 Va. 249; Russell v. Passmore, 127 Va. 
Va. 475.) 
The appellee apparently bases his contention that a parol 
trust has been created, by his statement that in August, 
1923, that he, John D. Greenhow spoke to Mr. Robert H. 
Jackson about buying a lot and that Mr. Jackson suggested 
that he buy a house and asked him what he would be will-
ing to pay and stated that he would see what he could do. 
(See Record 53.) The appellee further testified that noth-
ing was said between him and Jackson in reference to the 
terms of his purchase until after Mr. Jackson had pur-
chaaed the property.. He states that he did not know what 
the price was until Mr. Jackson came to his house and told 
him he had! purchased the property for $800.00 and 
would sell it to him for what he paid for it allowing him 
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to work it out. This conversation, however, was after Mr. 
Jackson had purchased the property. In Shield. and others 
v. Adkins & Company, and others, 117 Va. 616, the court 
said that in order to establish a parol trust in land the 
agreement must be certain and definite in all its terms. The 
court further said the first requisite of a contract to en-
title one to its specific performance in equity is certainty 
and definiteness in its terms, and all of these terms must 
have been fully agreed to by the parties and none of them 
to be determined by future negotiations. The contract 
sought to be enforced must be made to appear reasonable, 
clear and definite, both as to terms and subject, and mutual 
in obligation and remedy. The appellee's testimony and 
the testimony suomitted. in his behalf fails to show that 
any agreement was made between the appellee and Mr. 
Jackson prior to the purchase by Mr. Jackson of the prop-
erty from Clifton Williams. 
Mr. Jackson testified that several months prior to the 
purchase of this property he spoke to Mr. Dana, a real 
estate agent in Williamsburg, in reference to its purchase. 
This testimony is corroborated by Mr. Dana who was a 
witness on behalf of the appellee. Mr. Dana testified that 
Mr. Jackson had come to his office in either June or July 
and asked him to be on the look-out for a house so he could 
get it and sell it to a man to work steady for him. Mr. 
Dana testified that at that time Ml!. Jackson did not say 
it was Greenhow, but for some man to work steady. (See 
Record 83.) 
The appellee, in his brief, further contends that regard-
less of the parol trust, he is entitled to specific performance 
of the contract. The appellee testified that since being in 
the house he had had it fixed once or twice and had put in a 
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sanitary house, all the work being done by one Otis J. 
Luster. He further states that he had put in some flowers 
and bought $5.00 worth of trees. (See Record 25 & 26). 
Mattie Greenhow, wife of the appellee, testified that the 
first thing she knew about this arrangement was after Mr. 
Jackson had bought the property and came to the house 
and told Greenhow; and that Greenhow had bought some 
trees and put them out and that Mr. Jackson had bought 
some of them for him. (See Record 60). Otis Luster tes-
tified that he made all the improvements that Greenhow 
had put on the house, and that the cost of these improve-
ments was $10.00. (See Record 67, 68 & 74). At most, the 
total improvements made by Grenhow on the property or 
buildings thereon amounted to $15.00 over a period of 
some five years. The appellee would have the court grant 
him the right of specific performance without first having 
met all of the requisites as set out in the case of Shield v. 
Adkins cited above. 
In the case of K:inchloe v. Bounds, 117 Va. 735, which is 
relied on by the appellee, the purchase price had been fully 
paid by the party asking for specific performance and the 
contract had been performed and so far executed that a 
refusal of full execution would operate as a fraud. In this 
case Greenhow has been in possession but has spent only 
$15.00 in improvements, and the sum paid by him has 
been equivalent to a rental of from $6.00 to $8.00 per 
month for the time he had occupied the property which is 
a rental less than that which he was paying at the time 
he took posession of the property. 
In the case of Fleenor v. Hensley, 121 Va. 367, relied on 
by the appellee, the evidence showed clearly. that the ap-
pellant purchased the property for "Liz and Martha," and 
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that the cash payment on the property or purchase was 
made by "Liz and Martha," and the balance of the pur-
chase price paid by the proceeds from a sale of a portion 
of the property purchased in the name of the appellant. 
This case can be easily distinguished from the case in ques-
tion. 
CROSS ERROR ASSIGNED BY APPELLEE 
1. The appellee assigns as cross error the court's de-
nial to submit as ail additional inquiry to the jury whether 
or not R. H. Jackson at any time subsequent to the con-
veyance from Williams to Jackson agreed with Greenhow 
for the purchase of the property by Greenhow. In the case 
of Brame v. Read, 136 Va. 219, and Jesser v. Arment'rout, 
100 Va. 666, the rule has been clearly established that sub-
sequent declarations are insufficient to establish a parol 
trust in land unless the trust was impressed by the grantor 
at the time of the conveyance. 
2. The appellee complains of the action of the court in 
submitting to the jury the inquiry as to notice. The ap-
pellee contends that Dr. Goodwin in his answer should 
have alleged that he was a purchaser for value, actual con-
sideration having been paid; that he was entitled to re-
ceive conveyance; that the grantor was in possession of 
the property at the time; and that these facts happened 
before notice of the adverse claim. In support of the ap-
pellee's contention the cases of Ro'rer & Co. v. Troute, 83 
Va. 397; Lama1· v. Hale, 79 Va. 147; and many other cases 
are cited. However, in the case of Rorer & Co. v. Troute the 
court said that where there is no allegation in the bill that 
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the purchaser had notice in order to a vail himself of this 
defense he must set up the facts fully in his answer. In 
this case, however, the bill of the appellee expressly al-
leges that W. A. R. Goodwin had notice from Robert H. 
Jackson and from John D. Greenhow and otherwise as to 
the right, interest, title and equity of the said John D. 
Greenhow and that neither the said W. A. R. Goodwin nor 
his wife, Ethel H. Goodwin, acquired any right, title and 
interest in said property, vested or contingent. Where 
this allegation appears in the bill a denial by Goodwin of 
this allegation is sufficient to allow him the defense which 
was allowed by the lower court. 
NOTICE TO PURCHASER 
The appellee contends that W. A. R. Goodwin had notice 
of the equities of John D. Greenhow by virtue of the fact 
that John D. Greenhow some years ago on a date which 
the said John D. Greenhow could not remember mentioned 
to Dr. Goodwin while working in his yard that Mr. Jackson 
was buying him a house. The appellee further contends that 
in the letter from Mr. Jackson to Dr. Goodwin the mention 
of the agTeement by Mr. Jackson was sufficient to put Dr. 
Goodwin on notice. In reference to the first contention 
'that Dr. Goodwin had notice from Greenhow it would be 
dignifying and unduly complimenting the memory of man 
to charge Dr. Goodwin with knowledge from so vague a 
statement as is made by John D. Greenhow. In reference 
to the second contention the record, pages 82 to 83 show 
that Mr. Jackson in his letter to Dr. Goodwin stated that 
since Greenhow had not fulfilled his agreement that he was 
at liberty to sell the property to Dr. Goodwin. But the 
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agreement which Mr. Jackson stated in his letter was not 
the agreement which the appellee contends to be the one 
on which he relied. As the record will show Mr. Jackson 
states that the agreement mentioned in the letter was the 
agreement to pay $10.00 a month on the balance of the 
purchase price paid by Jackson. This agreement having 
been made by Mr. Jackson to Greenhow in the year 1926 
or 1927, some three years after Greenhow had taken pos-
session, as an inducement to Greenhow to pay the amount 
he was in arrears on his rent. Mr. Jackson said quite 
frankly that he was tired of the continual arrears of Green-
how and stated that he would give him the property if h~ 
would pay $10.00 a month promptly until he had paid the 
full purchase price. (See Record 83-112.) Surely this 
agreement was nothing more than an oral contract to sell 
real estate and therefore was not such an agreement as 
would put Dr. Goodwin on notice. The appellee contends 
that Mr. Jackson revealed to Dr. Goodwin that Greenhow 
was not a tenant. But the contention of the appellant is 
that the revelation made by Jackson was not such as would 
make it the duty of an ordinary prudent citizen to inquire 
fu~her. In that the revelation made by Jackson showed 
clearly that Greenhow had no enforceable right nor equities 
in the property. In BurweU v. Fauber 21 Gratt (62 Va.) 
463; Richmond v. Stone, 148 Va. 686; and Effinger v. Hall, 
81 V a. 94, relied on by the appellee, and in the cases relied 
on by the appeilant in their petition, the rule is clearly 
established that fraud must be proved by clear and con-
vincing testimony and the party aileging must clearly and 
distinctly prove it; that notice may be proven either by 
direct or positive evidence or it may be inferred from the 
circumstances, but in either case the proof of such notice 
must be so strong and clear as to fix upon the grantee the 
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imputation of mctla fides. We submit that the revelation of 
Jackson to Goodwin not only failed to make it a duty on 
behalf of Goodwin to inquire of Greenhaw but was on the 
other hand an assurance· to Dr. Goodwin that Jackson had 
every right to convey the property to him, Goodwin, and 
that there was no further necessity for inquiry. 
3. The third assignment of cross error by the appellee 
is made to the refusal of the court to permit an amendment 
to the bill of complaint which would have changed com-
pletely the nature of the· suit brought after all of the evi-
dence was in. 
4. The fourth assignment of error on behalf of the ap-
pellee was made to the failure of the court to direct issues 
as to subsequent staten1ents made between Greenhaw and 
Jackson and the failure of the court to again allow the 
amendment as asked for by the appellee. This assignment 
is without merit having been previously discussed. 
5. The fifth assignment of error by the appellee is to 
the refusal of the court to grant instruction "C" and "D" 
as asked by the complainant and the court's refusal to 
grant instruction "F" as asked and in amending same. 
Instruction "C" asked for by the complainant directed the 
jury to find that Dr. Goodwin had notice. Such an instruc-
tion would of course have been improper. Instruction "D" 
asked for by the complainant placed upon Dr. Goodwin a 
greater burden than the law required. Instruction "F" also 
as asked for by the complainant shifted the burden upon 
Goodwin and was amendea to correctly state the law. 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion the appellants most earnestly and respect-
fully submit that the appellee, the ~omplainant in the 
lower court, failed to establish such an agreement as would 
create a parol trust in land; that there has been no agree-
ment nor act which would entitle the appellee to the relief 
sought; and, that W. A. R. Goodwin and Ethel H. Goodwin, 
'his wife are bona fide purchasers for value and without 
notice. And that the decree of the lower court should be 
reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
V. M. GEDDY, 
ASHTON DOVELL, 
Williamsburg, Virginia, 
Counsel for Appellants. 
